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Delineating the differential effects of anxiety versus depression on patterns of information processing
has proved challenging. The tripartite model of mood disorders (Clark & Watson, 1991) suggests that one
way forward is to adopt a dimensional rather than categorical approach, making it possible to explore the
main and interaction effects of depression- and anxiety-speciﬁc symptoms on a given cognitive-affective
process. Here we examined how the interplay of anxiety-speciﬁc arousal and depression-speciﬁc
anhedonia symptoms in the same individuals relate to interoceptive (bodily) awareness. 113 participants
with varying levels of mood disorder symptoms completed a heartbeat perception task to assess
interoceptive accuracy. Superior interoception was associated with anxiety-speciﬁc arousal symptoms,
and this relationship held when controlling for depression-speciﬁc anhedonia symptoms and shared
general distress symptoms. This main effect was qualiﬁed by an interaction between anhedonia and
arousal. As anhedonia symptoms increased in severity, the relationship between arousal and intero-
ceptive accuracy became less strong. These results further validate the tripartite framework, help clarify
the mixed existing literature on interoception in mood disorders, and suggest that considering the
unique and interactive effects of different symptom dimensions is a useful strategy to help identify the
cognitive-affective proﬁles associated with anxiety and depression.
Crown Copyright  2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Cognitive approaches to anxiety and depression are under-
pinned by the proposal that each condition is associated with
a relatively distinct pattern of alterations in information processing
(Mineka, Rafaeli, & Yovel, 2003), the identiﬁcation and normaliza-
tion of which are central to effective differential diagnosis and
intervention (e.g. Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Segal et al., 2006).
Consequently, there has been a strong research focus on identifying
unique cognitive-affective proﬁles associated with different
emotional disorders.
While there is reasonable support for notions of ‘content’
speciﬁcity, with anxiety being linked to a preoccupationwith threat
and depression being associated with loss (for a review see Beck,
2005), compelling evidence of ‘process’ speciﬁcity has yet to be
established at the diagnostic level. Mixed ﬁndings have emerged
from studies examining judgment, attentional and mnemonic
biases in diagnoses of anxiety versus depression, even when
comparing ‘pure’ cases of each condition in the same experimentB.D. Dunn).
evier Ltd. Open access under CC BY liand on the same measures (Dunn, Stefanovitch, Buchan, Lawrence,
& Dalgleish, 2009; Mineka et al., 2003). For example, anxiety
disorders have been reliably associated with threat related atten-
tional biases, with an inconsistent picture emerging regarding
memory biases. In depression there is robust evidence for prefer-
ential recall of negative material but mixed evidence regarding
attentional biases (see Williams et al., 1997). It is hard to argue that
these information processing biases can fully differentiate between
diagnoses of anxiety and depression, given the inconsistent but
sometimes positive ﬁndings of memory biases in anxiety and
attentional biases in depression (see Dunn et al., 2009).
A prototypical candidate for examining processing speciﬁcity is
that of interoceptive ability. This is the ability to detect changes in
the body (including muscles, skin, joints and viscera), enabling
individuals to experience bodily ‘feelings’ such as pain, tempera-
ture, itch, and hunger (Craig, 2002). There has been increasing
theoretical interest in the possibility that interoception may be
altered in mood disorders. For example, heightened awareness of
bodily arousal, alongside misattributions of the source of the
arousal, is believed to contribute to the maintenance of panic
disorder and social phobia (e.g. Clark, 1986; Clark & Wells, 1995).cense.
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anxiety and depression to interoceptive ability presents exactly the
sort of mixed picture discussed above. In panic disorder some
studies ﬁnd superior heartbeat perception (e.g. Ehlers & Breuer,
1992; Zoellner & Craske, 1999), but there have been notable fail-
ures to replicate this effect and it has been argued that these
discrepant ﬁndings may reﬂect the fact that only a subset of panic
sufferers show elevated interoception (Van-der-Does, Antony,
Ehlers, & Barsky, 2000). Conversely, studies show a non-signiﬁ-
cant trend for reduced interoceptive accuracy in depression (e.g.
Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch, & Schandry, 2009;
Van-der-Does, Van-Dyck, & Spinhoven, 1997) and that higher levels
of depression symptoms in the general population are associated
with less accurate interoception (Pollatos et al., 2009). We recently
found that while dysphoric individuals showed impaired intero-
ceptive ability, this deﬁcit normalized in individuals diagnosed
with Major Depressive Disorder (Dunn, Dalgleish, Ogilvie, &
Lawrence, 2007).
One possible reason for this mixed empirical picture regarding
interoceptive performance is that most studies have been under-
pinned by the current DSM diagnostic classiﬁcation system. This
divides psychological distress into distinct typologies with unique
deﬁning features (e.g. “depressed”, “anxious”, or “healthy”) (APA.,
1994). However, it is increasingly debated whether such absolute
distinctions between diagnoses exist; comorbidity is the rule rather
than the exception, individuals often cross diagnostic boundaries
over time, and there are ‘boundary disputes’ about how to classify
presentations that fall between categories (Mineka, Watson, &
Clark, 1998; Widiger & Samuel, 2005).
An alternative to this diagnostic approach is to conceptualize
depression and anxiety as dimensional constructs, with individ-
uals lying somewhere on a series of overlapping continua ranging
from symptom free to highly symptomatic (e.g. Watson, 2005;
Widiger & Samuel, 2005). Elevations on particular dimensions
may be speciﬁc to a given diagnosis, whereas other dimensions
may characterize multiple diagnoses. For example, the tripartite
framework (Clark & Watson, 1991; Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994)
proposes that high levels of ‘general distress’ (non-speciﬁc nega-
tive affectivity) are a feature of both anxiety and depression. In
contrast, speciﬁc to anxiety are elevated physiological hyper-
arousal, whereas speciﬁc to depression are elevated symptoms of
anhedonia.1
If it is such dimensions, rather than diagnoses, that are related to
a particular processing style (for example, heightened/diminished
interoceptive ability), then this would account for the mixed
empirical ﬁndings from diagnostic caseecontrol studies. Clinical
participants in such studies, despite being diagnostically homoge-
neous, would most likely be heterogeneous as regards their proﬁle
of elevated scores on the pertinent symptom dimensions.
The primary aim of the present study was therefore to examine
the inﬂuence of the tripartitemodel symptom dimensions (Watson,
2005) on interoceptive awareness. As well as clarifying a confusing
theoretical literature and helping to understand comorbidity, such
an approach also has clinical relevance by helping to identify those
for whom interoceptive awareness is disturbed. Given that these
interoceptive mechanisms may in turn contribute to other cogni-
tive-affective process known to be disturbed in anxiety and1 While data have generally supported the tripartite model, recent evidence
indicates that anxious arousal is speciﬁcally related to panic and PTSD rather than
to anxiety disorders generally. Further, anhedonia is found in social phobia as well
as depression (for a review, see Watson, 2005). This, and other evidence, has led to
the genesis of a new structural model of emotional disorders, which distinguishes
between fear conditions (e.g. panic, social phobia), distress disorders (e.g. GAD,
depression, PTSD) and bipolar disorders.depression (cf. Damasio, 1994; Dunn et al., in press; James, 1884; for
reviews see Dalgleish, Dunn, & Mobbs, 2009; Dunn, Dalgleish, &
Lawrence, 2006), this has the potential to help target body-
focused clinical interventions to appropriate individuals (e.g.
interoceptive exposure; Ellard et al., 2010).
In formulating our hypotheses, two ways in which dimensions
could differentially impact interoceptive ability seemed critical.
First, a given dimension could be uniquely associated with intero-
ceptive awareness. Secondly, such main effects could be qualiﬁed
by interactions; for example, scores on one dimension ‘moderating’
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986) the strength of the relationship that exists
between interoceptive awareness and scores on another
dimension.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis was that interoceptive accuracy would
be greater in individuals with greater arousal, and this would
hold when covarying for scores on the other symptom dimen-
sions (cf. Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Zoellner & Craske, 1999) (i.e.
a unique main effect). Second, we predicted that this main effect
would be qualiﬁed by an interaction between arousal and
anhedonia, such that the strength of the relationship observed
between interoceptive awareness and arousal would be reduced
in those with relatively higher levels of anhedonia symptoms (a
moderation relationship).
The motivation for this second hypothesis came from recent
ﬁndings that a negative relationship between depression and
interoception is only found in those with relatively higher trait
anxiety (Pollatos et al., 2009). In this study anxiety and depression
were not measured as separable dimensions (cf. the tripartite
model) but on standard questionnaires (the Spielberger Trait
Anxiety Inventory [Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs,
1983; STAI-T] and the Beck Depression Inventory [Beck, Ward,
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; BDI], respectively) and the
interactive effect of these questionnaire measures on interoception
was only trend signiﬁcant. Further, it was conducted with healthy
undergraduates with generally very low anxiety and depression
symptom levels (BDI: mean¼ 3.49, SD¼ 3.50; STAI-T: mean¼ 37.74,
SD¼ 10.69), so can only provide a hint at what might happen in
a sample where the broad ranges of symptoms are included.
Nevertheless, these data suggest that in a sample in which wider
ranges of anxiety-speciﬁc and depression-speciﬁc symptoms are
measured as separable dimensional constructs, an important
interactive effect of these dimensions might emerge.
We measured interoception by asking participants to count the
number of heartbeats they felt over varying time intervals
(Schandry, 1981) and comparing this to an electrocardiogram (ECG)
record (cf. Dunn et al., 2007). Participants completed the short form
of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ-S) as
a measure of the tripartite symptom dimensions (Watson & Clark,
1991; Watson et al., 1995). Appropriate analysis of dimensional
inﬂuences on cognitive-affective processing requires a different
sampling approach to the traditional caseecontrol design prevalent
in the literature. Consequently, we recruited a single sample of
community volunteers and stratiﬁed our recruitment such that the
sample represented a wide range of scores on the MASQ dimen-
sions, up to and including clinical levels.
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirteen participants (82 women) aged 18e65
years (M¼ 43.09; SD¼ 16.10) were recruited from the Cognition
and Brain Science Unit’s database of community volunteers. This
holds details of depression and anxiety levels when participants
were last contacted, allowing us to stratify recruitment to ensure
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the mood and interoception measures (N¼ 113).
Mean SD Min Max
Interoception % error 32.34 16.93 3.65 85.22
MASQ-S e general distress 41.12 13.06 23 75
MASQ-S e anxious arousal 22.79 5.59 17 48
MASQ-S e anhedonia 58.26 15.34 29 95
MASQ-S e total score 122.16 29.25 70 186
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screened using a brief semi-structured interview and excluded if
they reported any history of brain injury, psychosis, learning
disability, or substance abuse. Fourteen individuals were taking
anti-depressant medication (six using SSRIs, three using SNRIs, one
using a beta-blocker, and one using a tricyclic). Mean estimated full
scale IQ according to the National Adult Reading Test (NART;
Nelson, 1982) was 118.45 (SD¼ 7.14). Due to time constraints and
because the conceptual focus of the study was on dimensional
rather than categorical approaches to the mood disorders, diag-
nostic status of participants was not recorded. Participants gave
written informed consent, were reimbursed the equivalent of US
$10 per hour for their time, and the studywas approved by the local
research ethics committee.
Symptom measures
On the MASQ-S (Watson & Clark, 1991; Watson et al., 1995),
participants are asked to judge for each of 62 items howmuch they
have felt the way described over the past week, ranging from 1 (not
at all) to 5 (extremely). Twenty two items measure depression-
speciﬁc anhedonia symptoms (e.g. “felt like nothing was very
enjoyable”, maximum score¼ 110), 17 items index anxiety-speciﬁc
hyper-arousal symptoms (e.g. “was trembling or shaking”,
maximum score¼ 85), and 23 items record general distress
symptoms common to both anxiety and depression (e.g. “felt sad”;
maximum score¼ 115). Participants additionally completed the
BDI-I and STAI-T.
Interoceptive accuracy
Interoceptive accuracy was measured using the amended
version of the Schandry (1981) heartbeat perception task, as
described by Ehlers and Breuer (1992). On each of six computerized
trials participants counted how many heartbeats they felt over
a period of time (2 35 s, 2 25 s and 2 45 s), which was then
compared to howmany heartbeats were actually measured by ECG.
Each trial began with an 800 Hz, 100 ms tone, warning participants
to get ready. Three seconds later a 1000 Hz, 50 ms tone was
sounded, signalling participants to begin counting their heartbeats.
After a variable time period an identical tone was heard, signalling
participants to stop counting their heartbeats and to enter their
heartbeat estimate. Participants completed one practice heartbeat
trial (12 s).
It has been argued that participants may successfully perform
this task without any genuine interoception awareness by counting
time and then making educated guesses based on beliefs about
their heart rate (Ring & Brener, 1996). If this is the case, intero-
ceptive accuracy should be related to time estimation accuracy and
resting heart rate (HR) belief accuracy. To explore this possibility, in
three time estimation trials (123 s, 156 s, 140 s in length)
participants were asked to estimate how many seconds elapsed
between two tones. Estimates were then compared to a stopwatch
recording. Further, resting HR during a 3 min relaxation period
prior to the interoception task wasmeasured and then compared to
participants’ estimate of their resting HR to provide a measure of2 To ensure a wide symptom spread we generated two lists of volunteers from
our participant panel, one targeting individuals with previous symptom scores in
the non-clinical range and one identifying individuals with symptom scores
previously in the clinical ranges. The MASQ-S total score across the entire sample
was satisfactorily distributed, KolmogoroveSmirnov test of normality (113)¼ .08,
P¼ .05, skewness¼ .28, kurtosis¼ .78, meaning bimodality was not of concern. The
sample was not stratiﬁed for other demographic variables, such as age, gender or
estimated IQ.HR belief accuracy. Age, gender, anti-depressant medication status,
body mass index (BMI), resting HR, IQ, and physical activity
(assessed using the scale described by Ehlers & Breuer, 1992) have
also been associated with heartbeat perception accuracy, so these
details were additionally measured.
HR was recorded used a BIOPAC MP100 unit and an ECG
100B ampliﬁer acquiring data at 200 samples per second, con-
nected to a PC running Acqknowledge 7.2 software (BIOPAC.,
1997). Interoception-, time- (on a trial-by-trial basis) and HR
belief accuracy are expressed as percentage error scores. These
were calculated by taking the modulus of the actual value minus
the estimated value, dividing this by the actual value, and
then multiplying by 100 ([jactual estimatedjO actual ] x 100)
(cf. Ehlers & Breuer, 1992).
Procedure
Participants were screened and completed the questionnaires.
The psychophysiology electrodes were attached, resting HR was
recorded, and participants then completed the interoception
paradigm, along with other measures not reported here.
Results
Exploratory analyses
Table 1 shows mean scores and spread for the measures. There
was a satisfactory range of scores on the mood and interoception
measures, comparable to previous studies (e.g. Van-der-Does et al.,
2000). Of note, 42 participants had a BDI score greater than 10,
indicating at least mild levels of depression, and of these 23
participants had a BDI score greater than 15, indicating moderate to
severe levels of depression (Shaw, Vallis, & McCabe, 1985). Thirty
eight participants had a STAI-T score greater than 50, indicating
high levels of trait anxiety. Scores on the MASQ factors also
extended into ranges previously found in clinically diagnosed
groups (e.g. Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Ratner, & Fava, 2009). This
sample is more ‘clinical’ in nature than the one used by Pollatos et
al (2009), and in our view is comparable in terms of symptom
severity to other stratiﬁed sample studies in the literature (e.g.
Dunn et al., 2009).
Next, we examined the extent to which interoceptive accuracy
was related to potential confound variables. Interoception error
score was not signiﬁcantly associated with age, gender, NART
estimated IQ, anti-depressant medication usage, physical activity,
or BMI, greatest Pearson’s r¼ .11, Ps> .20. Interoception error wasBDI-I 8.82 7.12 0 35
STAI-Trait 43.73 10.18 20 67
STAI-State 37.52 9.06 20 59
Time % error 27.39 16.73 0 92.18
Resting heart rate 71.93 9.25 52.09 94.10
Heart rate belief % error 16.86 27.67 102.97 100
Physical activity 2.70 1.05 0 6
Body mass index 23.86 4.15 15.80 40.67
Note e BDI-I¼ Beck Depression Inventory-I; STAI¼ Spielberger State Trait Anxiety
Inventory; MASQ-S¼Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire e Short Form.
40
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related to time estimation error, r¼ .38, P< .001, and HR belief




























Fig. 1. Relationship between MASQ-S anxious arousal and interoception error as
a function of MASQ-S anhedonia. Note e Low/High¼ 1 SD below/above the mean. The
nuisance variables of resting heart rate, time trial % error, and HR belief accuracy are
partialled out before generating this ﬁgure.Interoception analyses
Table 2 reports the correlations of each MASQ factor with
interoception error (partialling out the nuisance variables). This
reveals that higher arousal, but not anhedonia or general distress,
is signiﬁcantly related to greater interoceptive accuracy.
Next, to explore unique and interactive effects of the different
MASQ factors on interoceptive accuracy we ran a hierarchical
regression. At step 1 we entered the nuisance covariates, at step 2
MASQ-S anhedonia, at Step 3 MASQ-S general distress, at Step 4
MASQ-S arousal, and at step 5 our interaction term, computed as
the product of the arousal and anhedonia scores (standardized [Z-
scored] to aid interpretation; cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Eight participants’ data were set aside, 2 as they were univariate
outliers, 4 as they were multivariate outliers (malhalanobis dis-
tance> 24.32 for seven variables; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001), and 2
as they lacked a valid estimate of HR belief accuracy. Step 1 of the
model was signiﬁcant, F(3,101)¼ 12.50, P< .01, DR2¼ .27. Time
estimation error, t¼ 4.10, P< .01, rp¼ .38, beta¼ .35, and HR belief
error, t¼ 3.28, P< .01, rp¼ .31, but not resting HR, t< 1, rp¼ .06,
beta¼ .06, were uniquely related to interoception error. Adding
anhedonia at Step 2, F< 1, and general distress at Step 3, F¼ 1.14,
DR2¼ .01, did not signiﬁcantly improve model ﬁt. Adding arousal at
step 4 of themodel did improve ﬁt, F(1,98)¼ 6.90, P¼ .01, DR2¼ .05,
t¼ 2.63, rp¼.26, beta¼.25, showing that higher interoceptive
error is uniquely associated with lower MASQ-S anxious arousal.
Adding the interaction term on Step 5 also accounted for a signiﬁ-
cantly greater proportion of the variance in interoception error,
F(1,97)¼ 4.85, P¼ .03, DR2¼ .03, t¼ 2.20, rp¼ .22, beta¼ .20. The
overall model was signiﬁcant, F(7,97)¼ 7.74, P< .001, R2¼ .36,
a large effect size according to Cohen’s rule of thumb (Cohen,1988).
To illustrate the interaction of arousal and anhedonia on inter-
oception error, we plotted the full regression equation in the
recommended way (Aiken & West, 1991) for the mean anhedonia-
dimension score and scores plus or minus 1 SD (Fig. 1). As anhe-
donia symptoms increased in severity, the relationship between
arousal and interoceptive accuracy became less strong.
We also examined whether this overall pattern was mirrored
in analyses which used STAI-T scores to index anxiety and BDI
scores to index depression (cf. Pollatos et al., 2009), instead of the
MASQ-S. Two participants’ data were excluded as multivariate
outliers for this analysis. We found that interoception error was
not signiﬁcantly uniquely related to scores on the STAI-T,
rp¼.09, P¼ .36, nor the BDI, rp¼ .14, P¼ .36, suggesting that
these measures are less sensitive than the separable dimensions
of the MASQ. A signiﬁcant interaction between BDI and STAI-T
was however found, F(1,107)¼ 8.67, P<.01, DR2¼ .07, t¼ 2.94,Table 2
Inter correlations between interoception error and MASQ-S factors.
1 2 3
Heartbeat % error (1) e
MASQ-S anhedonia (2) rp¼.00 e
MASQ-S general distress (3) rp¼.08 rp¼ .70* e
MASQ-S anxious arousal (4) rp¼.27* rp¼ .27* rp¼ .48*
Note e The nuisance variables of resting heart rate, time trial % error, and HR belief
accuracy are partialled out in the above analyses. *¼ signiﬁcant at P< .01. MASQ-
S¼Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire e Short Form.rp¼ .27, beta¼ .30, that was similar to the Arousal x Anhedonia
effect reported above3.Discussion
The present study examined the interaction of scores on
depression-speciﬁc anhedonia and anxiety-speciﬁc arousal
symptom dimensions (as postulated by the tripartite model; Clark
& Watson, 1991) on interoceptive accuracy in a large sample of
community volunteers with broad ranges of mood disorder
symptoms.
Supporting our ﬁrst hypothesis, anxiety-speciﬁc arousal but not
the other MASQ-S symptom factors was independently associated
with interoception accuracy. Consistent with our second hypoth-
esis, a signiﬁcant interaction between arousal and anhedonia
MASQ-S factors in the prediction of interoceptive accuracy was
demonstrated. As anhedonia symptoms increased, the relationship
between arousal and interoceptive accuracy became less marked.
These results generally support dimensional models of
emotional disorders such as the tripartite framework (Clark &
Watson, 1991) and identify different ways in which symptom
dimensions can inter-relate. The ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant relationship
of arousal with interoception accuracy when controlling for the
other MASQ factors is as far as we are aware the ﬁrst evidence of
processing speciﬁcity for the anxious arousal dimension. Impor-
tantly, no comparable unique relationship emerged between inter-
oception error and general symptom measures (BDI and STAI-T),
suggesting that considering theoreticallymotivateddisorder speciﬁc
symptom dimensions may increase explanatory power over and
above global severity measures. This complements existing work
showing processing speciﬁcity of the anhedonia factor on positive
informationprocessing (e.g. Dunn et al., 2009; Pizzagalli et al., 2009)
and offers construct validity for the anxious arousal dimension.
Further, as far as we are aware, the present data is the ﬁrst demon-
stration of an interactive relationship between tripartite symptom
dimensions and underlying cognitive-affective mechanisms.3 Following Pollatos et al. (2009), the BDI STAI-T analysis did not covary general
distress or the nuisance variables on previous steps. When these covariates were
removed from the AnhedoniaArousal analysis, the interaction step remained
signiﬁcant, F(1,95)¼ 8.28, P< .01, DR2¼ .06, t¼ 2.87, rp¼ .28, beta¼ .32.
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confusing clinical interoception literature. The subset of individuals
with panic disorder who show superior interoception (e.g. Van-der-
Does et al., 2000) may be those with few comorbid anhedonia
symptoms. Conversely, that we previously found impaired inter-
oception in a mildly depressed community sample and not in
a more severely depressed clinical sample (Dunn et al., 2007) may
reﬂect that the clinical group had greater levels of anxious arousal.
Clarifying in which individuals interoception is disturbed may
be clinically useful, helping lead to targeted delivery of bodily-
focused treatments. For example, the uniﬁed transdiagnostic
treatment protocol for mood disorders includes modular elements
focusing on exposure to interoceptive cues (Ellard et al., 2010). The
present data suggest individuals high in anxious arousal symptoms
and low in anhedonia may maximally beneﬁt from this particular
intervention element.
Here we purposefully eschewed the traditional caseecontrol
approach in favour of examining a single community sample
selected to represent the range of scores on the tripartite symptom
dimensions up to and including the clinical range. Although this
design provides the optimal test of the validity of using dimen-
sional approaches to understand proﬁles of cognitive-affective
processing, it would now be interesting to directly contrast the
ability of dimensional and diagnostic approaches to model the
variance in, for example, interoceptive accuracy, within the same
study.
Future research could also explore how different parts of the
bodily feedback system are related to particular mood disorders. It
can be speculated that some symptoms or disorders lead to
elevated or diminished responses in the body, whereas other are
associated with better or worse perception of these bodily changes,
and yet others lead to different appraisals of the signiﬁcance of
these changes. For example, it is conceivable that PTSD would be
linked to elevated bodily responsiveness, whereas panic would be
linked to elevated interoception and altered appraisal.
The present study suffers from several limitations. First, we
have focused here on cardiac perception and different ﬁndings
may emerge if other forms of interoception are examined. Second,
the effect sizes for the main and interactive effects of the MASQ-S
factors were individually small in magnitude (Cohen, 1988). That
said, the effect size for the overall model was large (Cohen, 1988),
indicating that the tripartite dimensions can account for
substantive variance in interoceptive processing. Third, socioeco-
nomic status or ethnicity is not measured, but as far as we are
aware these have not previously been associated with interocep-
tive accuracy.
In summary, the present study suggests that interoceptive
accuracy is in part determined by the interaction between scores on
depression and anxiety-speciﬁc symptom dimensions within the
same individual. These ﬁndings offer support for dimensional
models of affective disorders such as the tripartite framework
(Clark &Watson,1991) and suggest that exploring independent and
interactive effects of speciﬁc symptom dimensions on cognitive-
affective processing is a fruitful avenue for future research. In
addition, the results help clarify the confusing literature on inter-
oceptive awareness in emotional disorders and suggest that bodily
feedback mechanisms may be a legitimate target for clinical
intervention.Acknowledgements
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